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CARTEE,

Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 15158

vs.
PAULINE CARTER,

Defendant/Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

POINT I
TJIE DISTRICT COURT WHICH HEARD TIIE ORIGINAL DIVORCE
MATTF.R COJmECTLY CONTINUED Tiff OBLIGATION OF THE PLAINTIFF TO
Pi\Y ALIMONY.

POINT I I
THE DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED AN ATTORNEYS
HE FOR DEFENSE OF THE APPEAL HEREIN.

AMENDMENT TO STATEMENT OF FACTS

The defendant agrees with the statement of facts of
plaintiff as far as such statement goes, but adds some salient
facts omitted by plaintiff.
The action started in the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah County with the designated defendant as plaintiff
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(R 84) and the decree of divorce
1~ereafter,

for some unknown

a1;ardc'd de[cndzint (R \\.
plaintiff commenced an

action in the District Court of Davis County to have the
of the District Court of Utah County modifiell (R 24,25). Th·,
case was removecl to Utah County (R 37) ancl h'as treated as an
Order to Show Cause in the action originally brought in Utah
County ivhich showed respondent as plaintiff and appellant as
defendant (TR 3).
The plaintiff/appellant showed no change of circu~·
stances from the original decree in this matter h·hich a1,ardeJ
him property of a sales value of at least $45,000.00 (R SH6
The parties had heen married over 30 years at the commencemen'
of the divorce trial
(TR 17).

(R 57) (TR 17) and had had four children

The assets that defendant had at the hcar.ing of the

matter on modification came from the property awarded at the
original divorce hearing

(TR 18), and was substantially the

same as that awarded to plaintiff (TR 18).

There \Vas no sho·,,:

that plaintiff/appellant no longer had the assets aivarded to'·
at all at the time of the hearing of the divorce (TR 4). The
same judge who heard the matter for modification heard the
original divorce matter and was familiar with the i;hole ca'e
(TR 17).

The plaintiff/appellant, besides his Geneva Stcelr

received $300.00 per month ·f rom a VA pens ·Lon.

I.le
had
worked
1
•
•

• T.

at U. S. Steel Company for 27 years in 1976 and is eligi
for a substantial pension from the U. S. Steel Company (R

ble
34

l·

The plaintiff/appellant's gross earnings in 1975 thro~h
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- 3,~ovember 22,

1975, were $17,481.16 (EX 2-P).

Jlccc111ber 15, 1975 (R 57).

The trial began

As stated by counsel for plaintiff/

appellant, there was no change in circumstances at the time of
the hearing for modification (TR 4).
The employment of defendant/respondent is and was
temporary only (TR 16, 17).

The defendant taught school while

she was married for seven years only, and would have set aside
for retirement about $2,000.00 which might be matched by the
state (TR 18) (TR 19).

The decision of the Court was that while

the defendant/respondent was earning the sums she was able to
earn the alimony should be reduced to $100.00 per month (R 14).
The defendant/respondent was 57 years old as of November 2,
1976, and would now be 58 years (R 33).

The trial court did not allow defendant/respondent
an attorneys fee in this matter (R 14).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW

l~S

CORRECT IN ITS DECISION.

The Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court was
correct in reducing the amount of alimony from $350.00 per
month to $100.00 per month.

The Honorable District Judge was

familiar with the case, having tried the matter in the first
instance.

The parties had been married 30 years, had reared

four children.

The defendant, during the time of her marriage,

worked seven years.

The plaintiff at the time of the divorce
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matter 1vas carniu.0

"° substant.iall)'

O"~r

$1~

'c

I '

.

(llJCl 110
•

aI.

]'CT )'CJ I

in aclcli t ion had an income from ~1 Jll'lls ion o [

s-uo
oo per
.\
.

I I e wo u 1 cl be en t it 1 c d to s uh st ant i a J l' 'c

l )Cne f J- ts f ro111 ti"

0

U. S. Steel Company.

11 s .L· o ii
-

1110:1:

Jn aclcli.tion, he received an equal ar ou.
11

of property as was received by the Jefendant.

Tiw defendant

had the courage to go out and look for a job which must have
been contemplated at the time of the divorce in this matter.
The job defendant/respondent did receive ivas only tempo ran
and at her age she could not expect more than that.

It woul.'

be unconscionable and unfair for the Court to conclude that,
would not. be entitled to any alimony and that she would have
to deplete the amount awarded her under the decree of divorce
and when that was done, become a public charge.
The Trial Court is allowed consi.de rah le latitude c
discretion and its finding and decree will not be overturned
unless there has been a clear abuse of such discretion.
the case of \l/hiteheRcl vs. Whitehead (1965),

In

397 I'. 2d, 16Ut:

2d 197, on page 988, the Court stRted:
"Due to the prerogatives reposed in him under the.
law and to his advantaoed position, the tnal JUcl;c
must necessarily be allowed a wide latitude of
.
discretion in such matters, and his j uclgment
not be changed lightly, nor at all unlessundert,
fact shown by the evidence it works a man1~ 5 t
inequity or injustice".

shou:;

To the same effect are the cases, La1"1or vs· L~·
(1952) 121 Utah 201,

240 P.

-'--(_l_9_74~)'-'''-----5_2 7 p . 2 d l 3 5 9 ,

2d 271; ~litchell vs. Mite~.
Utah 2d
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In the latter case,
the hu.-ob;1J1(l sought to h;1ve an award for alimony reduced.
tri:il cottrt
satisficcl,

rn;Ldc

The

some reduction but the husband, not being

appealed the matter.

The Court said as set forth

on page 310 as follows:
"This proceeding seeking to modify the divorce
decree is in equity; and it is the prerogative of
this court to review the evidence, to make its
own findings, and to substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court when the ends of justice
so require. However, due to the prerogatives and
advantaged position of the trial court, we pursue
that broad authorization under certain rules of
review which are now well established: Its actions
are indulged with a presumption of validity and
correctness and the burden is upon the appellant
to show a basis for upsetting them: either (1) that
findings have been made when the e•idence clearly
preponderates the other way; or (2) that there
has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of
the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial
error; or (3) that it appears plainly that there
has been such an abuse of discretion that an
inequity or injustice has resulted."
Certainly there was no abuse of discretion in the
instant case and it is respectfully submitted that the trial
court would have been in error if it had terminated alimony.
The cases cited by plaintiff/appellant were decided
on their own peculiar facts and it is respectfully submitted
that such cases would not be controlling here.

POINT II
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED AN ATTORNEY'S FEE
FOR TH[ DEFENSE OF THE APPEAL.

The trial court did not award the defendant an attorney's fee in the matter of the request for a modification.

The
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- 6<lefendant has been required to dC'fcncl the appeal here iii,dnJ ,,
would seem proper that the Supreme Court should allow

;i

11

attorney's fee for the use and benefit of defendant's attorn
as the plaintiff is well able to respond.

It is submitted C·

I

the Court could do so under the ruling in the case, Elrnin0er

-~,

Ehninger (Utah, September 13, 1977), S69_J~~lJ21·

At

an attorney's fee could be set by the trial court.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
was correct in its determination to refuse to terrntnate ali11;:
and to hold that plaintiff should pay clefenclant/responclent

$100.00 per month as alimony.

'
I'

This Honorable Court ls further urged to direct the

I
!

allowance of an attorney's fee for the defendant in the defcn,
of the appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
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